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INTRODUCTION
Tort cases involving scientific uncertainty frequently present
courts with a difficult causation issue. In the paradigmatic case, the
available scientific evidence indicates that a substance might be
hazardous, but does not establish that the substance is hazardous.'
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I thank Eric Womack for his ex-
cellent research assistance. This research was supported by the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E.
Greenberg Research Fund of the New York University School of Law.
1. In a fundamental sense, any tort case involving science involves uncertainty, since
"[s]cientists understand that there is simply no way to prove a theory true or even probable, as
any theory may be subject to being disproved. So the most that can be said is that a particular
theory has withstood criticism and provides the best explanation of the data." Erica Beecher-
Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L
REv. 1563, 1581 (2000) (citations omitted). My use of the term "scientific uncertainty" is limited
to cases in which the available evidence provides scientific support for the plaintiffs claim, but
the evidence is not sufficient to establish that the claim can "withstand criticism and provide the
best explanation of the data." In addition to the paradigmatic example of such uncertainty de-
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When presented with such evidence, courts must decide whether
the plaintiff has adequately proven that her injury was tortiously
caused by the substance.
This causal issue potentially arises whenever we do not fully
understand how a substance interacts with the body and produces
an adverse health outcome. We do not, for example, adequately un-
derstand the etiology of cancer.2 To assess whether a substance may
cause injuries with unknown etiology, we observe health outcomes
in populations of animals exposed to large amounts of the sub-
stance, study the biochemical effects of the substance on cells, or-
gans, and embryos, and compare the substance's chemical composi-
tion to other known health hazards. 3 Though informative, these
studies usually cannot determine whether the substance is hazard-
ous. That determination typically requires a large-scale study com-
paring the incidence of adverse health outcomes in groups of ex-
posed and non-exposed individuals, or comparing the incidence of
exposure across injured and healthy groups. These epidemiological
studies are expensive, time-consuming, and require that a large
number of people be exposed to the substance. Without such study,
however, the hazardous properties of the substance often cannot be
established with existing scientific methods. Consequently, sub-
stances are often introduced into the environment before there is
conclusive scientific evidence regarding their health hazards. How
should this scientific uncertainty affect the tort rights of an indi-
vidual who has been exposed to such a substance and has the type
of injury, such as cancer, that is plausibly attributable to the sub-
stance in light of the available scientific evidence?
After the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,4 an increasing number of
courts have held that causation must be established by epidemiol-
ogical evidence showing that a population of individuals exposed to
the substance faced at least twice the risk of suffering the injury in
scribed in the text, other common tort examples include uncertainty over the degree of risk posed
by a substance known to be hazardous, or the degree of risk a known hazard posed for a par.
ticular individual. Analysis of the paradigmatic form of uncertainty provides a basis for analyz-
ing these other forms of uncertainty. See infra Part IV.
2. See, e.g., CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING Toxic SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
AND LAW 18 (1993).
3. For descriptions of the scientific approaches to risk identification, see id. at 3-48;
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121-220 (1994); MICHAEL
D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS Toxic SUBSTANCES
LITIGATION 26-43 (1996).
4. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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question.5 According to these courts, such epidemiological studies
are the only reliable evidence showing that the substance more
likely than not caused the plaintiffs injury.6 Numerous commenta-
tors criticize this evidentiary requirement, arguing that it is incon-
sistent with fundamental tort principles, particularly when applied
to substances that have not been subjected to epidemiological
study.7 According to these critics and others, the lack of conclusive
scientific evidence, and the unfairness of placing the burden of fac-
tual uncertainty on plaintiffs, require the adoption of special rules,
such as placing the burden on a defendant manufacturer to prove
that its product is not hazardous.8
The vast majority of potentially hazardous substances have
not been subjected to epidemiological study,9 creating an eviden-
tiary gap of potential concern to the tort system.'0 In some impor-
tant contexts involving evidentiary gaps, application of ordinary
rules would undermine tort norms, so the tort system has adopted
5. See Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Us-
ing Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L, REV. 335,
339 (1999). Not all courts have adopted this requirement. See David L. Faigman et aL, How
Good Is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L REV.
645, 663 (2000) ("It is now clear that courts will not exclude causal opinions based on non-
epidemiological evidence in situations where a body of such data does not exist"). For a descrip-
tion of the various approaches taken by the courts, with case citations, see Andrew See, Use of
Epidemiology Studies in Proving Causation, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 478, 479 (2000).
6. See Finley, supra note 5, at 349.52 (providing a non-exhaustive list of cases).
7. See, e.g., Margaret Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New The-
ory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUAI. L. REV. 2117, 2131-34 (1997); Finley, supra note 5, at
363-76; see generally Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump State Tort
Policy? The Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L REV. 1837 (1994).
8. See Berger, supra note 7, at 2140-52 (proposing the elimination of the requirement of
general causation and instead imposing liability on defendants for failing to adequately test or
disclose information regarding potential hazards); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in
Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1, 45 (1995) (proposing that, if plaintiff can demon-
strate strong uncertainty regarding causation, the burden of proof should be shifted or plaintiffs
should receive proportionate 50% recovery); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manu-
facture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773 (1997) (proposing a presumption that an in-
sufficiently tested product caused the plaintiffs harm); see also Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liabil-
ity for Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891 (1997)
(arguing that the burden of proof on causation should be shifted to the defendant because the
defendant created the factual uncertainty by exposing the plaintiff to the substance in question).
9. See CRANOR, supra note 2, at 4 (observing that, of the more than 55,000 commercial
chemicals, only six or seven thousand had been subjected to chemical study as of the early
1990s); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CrR., supra note 3, at 193 ("It must be emphasized that less than 1%
of the 60,000-75,000 chemicals in industrial commerce have been subjected to a full safety as-
sessment, and only 10-20% have any toxicological data at all").
10. The concept of an "evidentiary gap," and its relation to normative concerns, is identified
by Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54
VAND. L. REV. 941 (2001).
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special rules to redress the inequity." An important question, then,
is whether cases of scientific uncertainty involve the type of prob-
lem that justifies a special evidentiary rule for establishing causa-
tion.
As Part I shows, the critics of the epidemiological eviden-
tiary requirement have not justified a special rule for cases of scien-
tific uncertainty. Part II then explains why there is no need to
adopt new evidentiary rules in the products liability context. In the
paradigmatic case involving cancer, for example, tort liability can
be imposed on product sellers for not adequately warning about the
scientific evidence suggesting that the product is carcinogenic. The
issue of whether the product caused the plaintiffs cancer involves
the extent of damages. This causal issue in the damages phase is
already governed by a special evidentiary rule, which does not re-
quire epidemiological proof showing that the product is carcino-
genic. In this context, the epidemiological evidentiary requirement
is inconsistent with current doctrine and can be eliminated without
adopting new rules.
Cases outside of the products liability context require differ-
ent analysis, because the hazardousness of the substance deter-
mines the appropriateness of imposing any liability on the defen-
dant. Part III shows that the appropriate tort norm supports a re-
quirement of epidemiological proof. The tort norm, as reflected in
the ordinary evidentiary standard, addresses the problem of factual
uncertainty, and the associated problem of legal error, by giving
equal weight to the competing interests of deserving plaintiffs and
non-culpable defendants. By placing the initial burden of factual
uncertainty entirely on plaintiffs, the requirement of epidemiologi-
cal proof appears to be unfair. However, an equal apportionment of
uncertainty is not attainable given the current state of scientific
knowledge. Alternative evidentiary approaches, such as shifting the
burden of proof to defendants, would place an even greater burden
on non-culpable defendants, thereby violating the tort norm un-
derlying the ordinary evidentiary standard.
Part IV concludes by ascertaining the limits of the epidemi-
ological evidentiary requirement. The requirement can be justified
as long as non-epidemiological forms of proof would yield incorrect
liability outcomes more than one-half of the time, so the require-
ment's validity necessarily depends on evolving approaches to risk
11. For a description of the various evidentiary rules pertaining to causation, see DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OFTORTS §§ 173-79 (2000).
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assessment and the forms of non-epidemiological proof involved in
the case. Another important limit pertains to the amount of risk
that must be identified by epidemiological study. Although many
courts require at least a doubling in risk, tort norms merely require
that epidemiological proof identify an increase in risk sufficient to
establish tortious conduct by the defendant. This conclusion stems
from the nature of epidemiological proof and the range of plausible
biological models for explaining the etiology of cancer and other
chronic diseases, coupled with the important distinction between
causal issues in the liability and damages phase of trial. Just as the
necessity of epidemiological proof depends on context, the degree of
increased risk that must be identified by epidemiological study is
also context dependent.
I. CRITIQUES OF THE REQUIREMENT THAT CAUSATION BE
PROVEN WITH EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDY
The epidemiological evidentiary requirement has been
widely criticized for being inconsistent with tort principles.' 2 These
criticisms have merit, but they do not establish the claim that, in
adopting the evidentiary requirement, courts have effectuated "sub-
stantive changes in causation law through the rubric of evidentiary
admissibility decisions."13
The most obvious problem with the evidentiary requirement
is that it provides inadequate incentives for manufacturers to fund
epidemiological study. As between individual plaintiffs and manu-
facturers, the cost of epidemiological study is most easily borne by
manufacturers. Manufacturers do not have an adequate incentive
to incur the cost of epidemiological or other study, though, if plain-
tiffs bear the burden of producing such evidence, so manufacturers
typically choose ignorance. In the mass tort litigations, for example,
the manufacturer in each case "did not test its product adequately
initially, failed to impart information when potential problems
emerged, and did not undertake further research in response to ad-
verse information."'14
This problem undoubtedly is of great social concern. It does
not, however, supply sufficient reason for altering ordinary tort
rules. The best incentives for research are provided by a tort rule
making manufacturers strictly liable for unknown or unforeseeable
12. These criticisms, with the appropriate attributions, are more fully described in Finley,
supra note 5, at 363-76.
13. Id. at 336.
14. Berger, supra note 7, at 2135.
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risks. 15 Nevertheless, tort liability is limited by the requirement
that the defendant acted tortiously with respect to a foreseeable
risk, and tortious conduct typically is defined in terms of negli-
gence. 16 The tort system's reliance on a negligence standard for
foreseeable risks implies that the attainment of optimal research
incentives is not a sufficient reason for imposing tort liability on
those who expose others to potentially hazardous substances.
To bolster the case against the epidemiological evidentiary
requirement, critics argue that the requirement inappropriately
relies on scientific norms rather than tort norms. Scientific norms
do undoubtedly differ from tort norms.' 7 For example, epidemiologi-
cal studies tend to yield more reliable or informative results as the
size of the sampled population increases. Larger sample sizes are
also more costly. Animal studies tend to be less informative and
less expensive than epidemiological studies.' 8 And other methods of
risk identification are even less informative and less expensive. 19
What is the appropriate relationship between the reliability or in-
formativeness of any given mode of scientific inquiry and cost con-
siderations? Scientists need not trade off reliability and cost consid-
erations in the same manner as the tort system, so the relevant sci-
entific norms differ from tort norms. Due to this difference, the fact
that scientists use only epidemiological proof to infer causation does
not mean the tort system must also rely on such proof to infer cau-
sation. The difference in scientific and tort norms accordingly re-
veals the need to determine independently whether tort norms re-
quire causal proof by epidemiological study; it does not show that a
tort norm is violated by the evidentiary requirement.
What, then, is the relevant tort norm? Here the critics point
to the unfairness of placing the entire burden of uncertainty on
15. See Steven Shavell, Liability and Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 259, 260 (1992).
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY §2 b).(c) (1998) (heroin-
after PRODUCTS LIABILITY] (limiting liability for design and warning defects to the lack of rea-
sonable care in reducing or avoiding foreseeable risks of harm).
17. A point extensively developed by CRANOR, supra note 2.
18. "It is much easier, and more economical, to expose an animal to a chemical or to perform
in vitro studies than it is to perform epidemiological studies." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CR., supra
note 3, at 194-95. But, "[iun the absence of an understanding of the biological and pathological
mechanisms by which disease develops, epidemiological evidence is the most valid type of scien-
tific evidence of toxic causation." Id. at 126.
19. In vitro studies, for example, are conducted in the laboratory and are less expensive and
less reliable than animal studies. See GREEN, supra note 3, at 36-37. For a ranking of the vari-
ous types of scientific evidence in terms of relevance for causation, see Beecher-Monas, supra
note 1, at 1604-26.
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plaintiffs, the outcome produced by the epidemiological evidentiary
requirement. As before, the criticism identifies a relevant concern
while begging the underlying question. In what way does the re-
quirement of epidemiological proof violate the tort norm regarding
the allocation of factual uncertainty? The ordinary evidentiary
standard, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, allows for
the possibility that some non-culpable defendants will incur liabil-
ity. The standard also allows for the possibility that some deserving
plaintiffs will not be compensated. Such errors are inevitable in a
world of limited information. How the risk of legal error, or the
burden of factual uncertainty, should be allocated between the par-
ties is the normative issue most obviously addressed by an eviden-
tiary standard. The norm underlying the ordinary evidentiary
standard places at least some burden of factual uncertainty on
plaintiffs. Even if the norm strives to equally apportion the burden
between plaintiffs and defendants, such a sharing of the burden
may not always be possible-one party or the other may have to
bear the entire burden. The mere fact that one party bears the en-
tire burden of uncertainty under an evidentiary rule, such as the
one requiring epidemiological proof, therefore does not necessarily
violate a tort norm of equality.
Thus, the critics of the epidemiological evidentiary require-
ment have raised valid concerns, but have not persuasively shown
that the requirement violates tort norms. The issue requires more
analysis. For reasons that will become apparent, the problem is
usefully analyzed by distinguishing between products liability cases
and other tort cases.
II. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND EVIDENTIARY
REQUIREMENTS IN THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CONTEXT
To analyze the epidemiological evidentiary requirement, we
will consider the following products liability case. The plaintiff-
consumer has cancer and claims that a defect in the defendant
manufacturer's product caused the injury. The alleged defect in-
volves the manufacturer's failure to warn about the risk of cancer.
To support the allegations, the plaintiff relies on scientifically valid
studies showing that the product contains a chemical known to be
an animal carcinogen. The plaintiff also relies on other scientifi-
cally valid laboratory studies supporting the hypothesis that the
chemical is a human carcinogen. Finally, the plaintiff has evidence,
such as the expert opinion of medical doctors, showing that her can-
cer was probably not caused by exposure to other known carcino-
gens. The plaintiff, however, does not have epidemiological evi-
1017
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dence, because no such studies have been conducted. The question
is whether the plaintiff should be able to recover for her cancer on
the basis of the foregoing evidence.
Defining the problem in this manner may seem puzzling.
Causation is an element common to all tort claims, and causal is-
sues in products liability cases are governed by general tort princi-
ples. 20 In the products liability context, however, the issue of
whether the product caused the cancer is mostly relevant for de-
termining the extent of damages rather than the appropriateness of
imposing liability on the defendant. Outside of the products liability
context, the causal issue is fundamental to the question of whether
any liability is appropriate. Proof of carcinogenicity therefore serves
different purposes in the two contexts, implying that each context
may require different types of evidence.
In the case under consideration, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant manufacturer is liable for failing to warn that the prod-
uct might cause cancer. This allegation can take two forms. The
plaintiff could allege that the warning is defective for not disclosing
that the product is in fact carcinogenic. Alternatively, the plaintiff
could allege that the warning is defective for not stating that the
product might be carcinogenic. The distinction between the two al-
legations is crucial. For the first allegation, the plaintiff must dem-
onstrate that the product is carcinogenic, a showing that may well
depend on epidemiological proof. For the second allegation, the
plaintiff need only demonstrate that the manufacturer should have
warned consumers about the scientific evidence of carcinogenicity, a
showing that does not require epidemiological proof.
For allegations of the second type, the plaintiff claims that
the product warning should have let consumers know there is a
reasonable scientific basis for concluding that the product might be
carcinogenic, even though the evidence is inconclusive. To establish
this claim, the plaintiff must first show that the requested disclo-
sure involves a foreseeable risk.21 The risk involves the possibility
that the product is carcinogenic. This risk is foreseeable, even
though there is not conclusive scientific evidence of carcinogenicity.
The plaintiff can show that the product contains a chemical known
to be an animal carcinogen and has other properties suggestive of
human carcinogenicity. This evidence provides a sufficient founda-
tion for the administrative regulation of the product as a human
20. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 15.
21. See id. § 2 (b)-(c).
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carcinogen. 22 The non-epidemiological evidence therefore provides a
reasonable basis for inferring that the product might be carcino-
genic, satisfying the requirement of foreseeability.
The plaintiff must next show that the product warning
should have disclosed the possibility or risk that the product is car-
cinogenic. The rationale for disclosure, as formulated by the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, is worth careful con-
sideration:
In addition to alerting users and consumers to the existence and nature of product
risks so that they can, by appropriate conduct during use or consumption, reduce
the risk of harm, warnings also may be needed to inform users and consumers of
nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere in using or
consuming the product. Such warnings allow the user or consumer to avoid the
risk warned against by making an informed decision not to purchase or use the
product at all and hence not to encounter the risk. In this context, warnings must
be provided for inherent risks that reasonably foreseeable product users and con-
sumers would reasonably deem material or significant in deciding whether to use
or consume the product.23
As this provision indicates, the manufacturer must disclose
the possibility that the product is carcinogenic if the disclosure
would be material to the consumer's decision of whether to pur-
chase or use the product. To see why this disclosure can be mate-
rial, compare the following bets.2 4 The first bet involves coin A,
which you have been able to examine. Suppose you confidently be-
lieve the coin is fair because it comes up heads or tails with ap-
proximately equal frequency. The second bet involves coin B, which
you have never seen and cannot examine prior to the bet. You do
not know if coin B is two-headed, two-tailed, or otherwise fair.
Without any further information about coin B, you might decide
that each of these coin configurations is equally likely, so you im-
pute a 0.5 probability of heads or tails to coin B (the equally likely
two-headed and two-tailed coins cancel one another out, leaving the
fair coin). You also impute the same probabilities to coin A. Do you
think the bets involving the two coins are identical, and does that
make a difference?
You have much more confidence in your probability assess-
ment of coin A than in your assessment of coin B. The difference is
irrelevant if you must bet now, for in that case you form a best es-
timate and bet accordingly. The best estimate for the two coins is
22. See, e.g., Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Rish from Exposure to
Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 270 (1992).
23. PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 16, § 2 cmt. m.
24. The example is drawn from JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALimcs OF
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 10-11 (1992).
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the same and hence there is no relevant difference between them in
this setting. The difference in your confidence of these estimates is
relevant, though, if you have the option of obtaining more informa-
tion prior to making the bet. When this option is available, you
should be more willing to invest effort or money to obtain informa-
tion about coin B than about coin A. For example, if you can observe
a toss of coin B, and the outcome is'heads, you can rule out the pos-
sibility that the coin is two-tailed. Observing the identical outcome
from a toss of coin A, by contrast, is unlikely to change your opinion
that the coin is fair. Hence "greater prior doubt (lesser degree of
confidence) makes it more important to acquire additional evidence
before making a terminal move [such as placing a bet]. ' 25
Now consider how this reasoning applies to the consumer's
decision of whether to purchase a product that might be carcino-
genic. Absent a warning, the consumer can be confident that the
product is not carcinogenic. By contrast, a consumer who is aware
of the animal studies and other indicators of carcinogenicity would
have much lower confidence in her assessment of the product risk.
The difference in confidence may not matter if the consumer must
make the consumption decision right now, but typically that is not
the case. Consumers usually have the option of waiting to consume
or use a product. Delayed consumption is costly for the consumer
(as she cannot derive any present benefit from the product), but the
cost of delayed consumption can be less than the benefit of waiting
to find out whether the product actually is a carcinogen. Informa-
tion about possible carcinogenicity, therefore, can influence the con-
sumer's decision whether to purchase or use the product. Such a
disclosure would reduce the consumer's confidence about the prod-
uct's safety, and may induce her to wait until further study has
been done. In these cases, the seller can be liable for not warning
about the potential that the product might be carcinogenic, despite
the lack of epidemiological evidence.
At this point in the tort inquiry, causal questions become
relevant, but not in a manner that requires epidemiological proof. A
warning defect can injure the plaintiff only if she would not have
purchased or used the product had she been adequately warned.
This causal issue is resolved in two different ways by the vast ma-
jority of courts. "A great many jurisdictions have adopted the
heeding presumption in failure-to-warn cases,"26 which presumes
25. Id. at 11; see also id. at 167-208 (developing the analytics of informational decisions).
26. Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 719 (N.J. 1993).
1020 [Vol. 54:3:1011
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that the plaintiff would have heeded or followed the warning had
the defendant given one. Virtually all other jurisdictions rely on a
subjective standard for establishing causation, which the plaintiff
can satisfy by testifying that she would not have purchased or used
the product had she been given an adequate warning.27
As I have argued elsewhere, the heeding presumption is
more defensible than the subjective standard.2 Suppose the disclo-
sure about the potential carcinogenicity of the product would in-
crease by 5% the average consumer's estimate of the cost of current
consumption as compared to delayed consumption. A 5% increase in
cost is material to the consumer's decision whether to purchase the
product now, yet a 5% increase in cost is unlikely to cause the aver-
age consumer to forego purchasing the product.2 For most products,
a 5% increase in price will cause some consumers to forego the pur-
chase, but how can the plaintiff show that she is one of these "mar-
ginal" consumers? Whether an individual is a marginal consumer
largely depends on the intensity of her preferences for the product.
The intensity of the plaintiffs preferences is inherently subjective,
and typically there is no objectively verifiable evidence on the mat-
ter. In most cases, then, the only evidence on causation consists of
the plaintiffs testimony that she would not have purchased the
product had she known it might be carcinogenic. For this reason,
the plaintiffs testimony is sufficient to satisfy the subjective stan-
dard in the jurisdictions that take this approach. But since the
plaintiff will almost always testify to that effect (otherwise why
bring the lawsuit?), these jurisdictions are doing nothing other than
presuming causation, the same outcome more defensibly achieved
by the heeding presumption.
As this discussion indicates, under either the heeding pre-
sumption or the subjective standard, the plaintiff will often be able
to establish that she would not have purchased the product had she
known it might be carcinogenic. At this point, the plaintiff has es-
tablished a tortious invasion of her autonomy interest-the right to
make "an informed decision not to purchase or use the product at
27. See Michael S. Jacobs, Toward A Process-Based Approach to Failureto-Warn Law, 71
N.C. L REV. 121, 162-63 (1992).
28. See Mark Geistfeld, Inadequate Product Warnings and Causation, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 309, 337-49 (1997).
29. The seller in these circumstances must warn about the potential hazard. See PRODUcTS
L.,BILrY, supre note 16, § 2 cmt. i ('Whether or not many persons would, when warned, none-
theless decide to use or consume the product, warnings are required to protect the interests of
those reasonably foreseeable users or consumers who would, based on their own reasonable
assessments of the risks and benefits, decline product use or consumption.").
1021
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
all"30-without having to rely on epidemiological proof. Whether the
product tortiously caused the plaintiffs cancer therefore involves a
question of damages rather than of liability.
Causal issues in the damages context-did the defendant
cause the full extent of harm underlying plaintiffs damages
claim?-are often subjected to standards of proof less demanding
than those required for causal issues concerning liability-did the
defendant tortiously cause any harm to the plaintiff?31 A relaxed
evidentiary standard for damages can be justified, according to the
U.S. Supreme Court, "[w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to
preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with cer-
tainty," because in these cases "it would be a perversion of funda-
mental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person,
and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his
acts. '32 This rationale for relaxing the demands of the ordinary evi-
dentiary standard has been applied in various tort contexts, such as
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and the
intentional spoilation of evidence. 33 The rationale is particularly
persuasive in cases of scientific uncertainty. The tortious conduct
consists of the failure to let consumers and users know about the
scientific uncertainty, so it would be perverse if the defendant could
rely on the uncertainty to escape liability in the damages phase.
Of course, a less demanding evidentiary standard does not
eliminate the plaintiffs burden of proving with reasonable certainty
that her cancer was caused by exposure to the product. Reason-
ableness depends on what can fairly be demanded of the plaintiff in
light of the defendant's tortious conduct. Hence, the plaintiff must
establish a reasonable scientific basis for concluding that the prod-
uct is carcinogenic, such as the animal and laboratory studies in the
context presently analyzed. Moreover, the plaintiff must introduce
evidence of specific causation that sufficiently eliminates the possi-
bility that her cancer was caused by some other carcinogen and not
the defendant's product. Reasonable proof, however, does not in-
volve epidemiological studies, for it is the absence of epidemiologi-
cal evidence, coupled with the indicators of carcinogenicity, that
30. Id. § 2 cmt. i.
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 cmt. a (1979).
32. Story v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
33. See generally Pati Jo Pofahl, Smith v. Superior Court- A New Tort of Intentional Spoila-
tion of Evidence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 961 (1985) (discussing the relaxed evidentiary requirements
for causal questions in cases of prospective economic advantage and the intentional spoilation of
evidence).
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creates the scientific uncertainty in the first instance. The plain-
tiff's right to know about the uncertainty was violated by the defen-
dant, so the defendant should not be able to escape liability by re-
lying on the uncertainty in the damages phase.
An alternative approach is to treat the damages for cancer as
punitive in nature. Punitive damages are often justified as a way to
provide the appropriate incentives for defendants to behave non-
tortiously. 34 If the defendant manufacturer were not liable for the
plaintiffs cancer, it would not have an adequate incentive to warn
about the possibility that the product is a carcinogen. Why give
consumers bad news about the product if there is no downside to
keeping the information secret? Once the manufacturer is liable for
the cancer, it assumes responsibility for the worst case scenario
that can be reasonably inferred from the current scientific under-
standing of the product. Rather than face liability for the worst case
scenario, a manufacturer would find it more cost-effective to behave
non-tortiously by disclosing the uncertainty to consumers and us-
ers. Disclosure of the uncertainty, in turn, increases consumer es-
timates of product cost, giving the manufacturer an incentive to
engage in further research to clear up the uncertainty.35
III. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND EVIDENTIARY
REQUIREMENTS OUTSIDE OF THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CONTEXT
Cases involving scientific uncertainty have been concen-
trated in the products liability area. Products liability cases can be
analyzed differently than other tort cases. The product seller's fail-
ure to adequately warn consumers of scientific uncertainty creates
a basis for liability that does not depend on epidemiological proof.
Tort cases in other contexts do not involve contractual relationships
or a right to informed consent that can be effectively enforced in
cases of scientific uncertainty.36 In these contexts, the plaintiff can-
34. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 381 at 1063 (CCourts usually emphasize that punitive damages
are awarded to punish or deter .... The idea of deterrence... is that a sufficient sum should be
extracted from the defendant to make repetition of the misconduct unlikey." ).
35. Sellers might choose to warn about the uncertainty and not engage in further research.
Such research could find the substance to be carcinogenic, forcing the seller to warn consumers
that the product is a carcinogen. As compared to a warning that the product might be carcino-
genic, a warning that the product is carcinogenic is likely to reduce consumer demand. This cost
of research has the potential to undermine the seller's incentive to study the hazards posed by
the product.
36. Medical malpractice cases are the closest analog to products liability cases, but there is
an important difference. Like products liability cases, malpractice cases involve a duty of disclo-
sure (the doctrine of informed consent), so, for the same reasons given in Part I, a plaintiffcould
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not establish liability by showing that the defendant's failure to
apprise her of scientific uncertainty violated her right to informed
decision-making. For these contexts, an analysis of the epidemiol-
ogical evidentiary requirement must directly address the issue of
whether the requirement violates tort norms.
A tort norm based on corrective justice, which makes causa-
tion an essential predicate of liability, provides an obvious basis for
evaluating an evidentiary requirement pertaining to causation.
(The efficiency rationale for tort liability is discussed later.) As a
matter of corrective justice, the need for the plaintiff to establish
causation does not become any less important once the plaintiff has
already established duty and breach by the defendant. 37 If proof of
duty and breach, when coupled with factual uncertainty, fully satis-
fied the plaintiffs burden of proof, then there would be no good rea-
son for giving the plaintiff the initial burden of proving causation.
The burden of proof reflects an underlying norm concerning the ap-
propriate allocation of factual uncertainty between the parties, so
the mere existence of factual uncertainty cannot be a sufficient rea-
son for shifting the burden of proof on causation. 3 Instead, the
plaintiff needs to show why the factual uncertainty is "extraordi-
nary" in the sense that the norms underlying the ordinary burden
of proof justify a special rule for shifting the burden in the case at
hand.
A special rule can be justified if the plaintiff, by satisfying
ordinary evidentiary standards, shows that the defendant com-
pleted a tort. By proving that the defendant's tortious conduct more
likely than not caused some harm, the plaintiff establishes her right
in corrective justice to receive some compensation. If that right
cannot be adequately protected by ordinary rules, the court is em-
establish a breach of the duty without relying on epidemiological proof. But, unlike products
liability cases, the causal question in malpractice cases-would the plaintiff-patient have fore-
gone the prescribed treatment had she been adequately informed?-is governed by an objective
standard. See generally Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the
Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607. The objective stan-
dard effectively bars recovery for inadequate disclosure in all but the most extreme cases. See
generally id.; see also Geistfeld, supra note 28, at 339-41 (explaining why the objective standard
would bar recovery in most cases of inadequate disclosure). Hence, the tort right of informed
consent is unlikely to be of much help to plaintiffs in malpractice actions involving scientific
uncertainty.
37. See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass
Torts, in MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE U.S. LAW OF TORTS (Gerald Postema ed., forthcoming
2001).
38. For this reason, it is hard to defend the claim made by Porat & Stein, supra note 8, that
the burden can be shifted merely because the defendant is responsible for creating the uncer-
tainty by exposing the plaintiff to the substance.
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powered to protect the right by adopting special rules. If, however,
the defendant has not completed a tort, then the plaintiff has not
established her right to compensation and the corresponding need
to have the right protected by a special rule. 39
This justification explains why courts have adopted relaxed
evidentiary standards regarding damages, 40 since those rules apply
to cases in which the plaintiff has first proven that the defendant
completed a tort. This justification, though, would not permit al-
teration of the ordinary evidentiary rules merely because the case
involves scientific uncertainty. In the paradigmatic case, the plain-
tiff may be able to establish that the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care by not conducting further research in light of a rea-
sonable basis, such as animal studies, for concluding that the sub-
stance might be hazardous to human health. But what harm has
the plaintiff or anyone else suffered? Without establishing that the
substance is in fact hazardous, the plaintiff cannot show that she
has been harmed in any way by the defendant's failure to conduct
further testing. Without such a showing, there may be no justifica-
tion for altering the ordinary burden of proof on causation.
Even if the plaintiff has not established a completed tort, in
some contexts a special evidentiary rule possibly could be justified
on the basis of the norm for the ordinary evidentiary rule. The norm
requires that plaintiffs ordinarily bear the burden of proof on cau-
sation, but the norm could also require that plaintiffs be relieved of
that burden in special contexts, and those contexts may include the
paradigmatic case of scientific uncertainty. If, however, the norm
supports the requirement that plaintiffs establish causation by epi-
demiological proof, then tort principles do not require a special rule
in cases of scientific uncertainty.
What is the appropriate evidentiary norm? Consider the pre-
ponderance of the evidence rule, which is often called the "more-
likely-than-not" standard. Suppose the plaintiff establishes all ele-
ments other than causation. If the evidence shows there is a 50.1%
chance that the defendant caused the harm, the plaintiff can re-
cover even though there is a 49.9% chance that the defendant did
not cause the harm (a false positive). And if the evidence shows
there is a 50.1% chance that the defendant did not cause the harm,
the plaintiff cannot recover even though there is a 49.9% chance
that the defendant did cause the harm (a false negative). This stan-
dard, therefore, gives equal weight to the chance of a false positive
39. See generally Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 37.
40. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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and a false negative, a weighting that presumably reflects the nor-
matively acceptable allocation of factual uncertainty.
The same weight given to false positives and false negatives
reflects a normative position that gives equal weight or concern to
(1) the interest of a non-culpable defendant in avoiding liability
judgments based on limited factual information, and (2) the interest
of a victim who does not receive her rightful compensation due to
limited factual information. These competing interests appear to be
normatively equivalent, so giving them equal weight seems to con-
form to the norm of equality. On this view, the norm underlying the
ordinary evidentiary standard in tort law strives to apportion
equally the burden of factual uncertainty (or erroneous legal de-
terminations) between deserving plaintiffs and non-culpable defen-
dants. 41
The norm, however, requires further elaboration. The ordi-
nary evidentiary standard allows the jury to conclude that a fact
has been established if the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would enable a reasonable juror to con-
clude that the fact more likely than not exists.42 The standard,
therefore, may give the jury some latitude in choosing a version of
the facts before it must apply the more-likely-than-not standard.
The courts have not adequately addressed the appropriate relation-
ship between the jury's selection of facts and the more-likely-than-
not standard. 4 This relationship can be analyzed in terms of the
betting problem described earlier in Part II. The problem involves
an individual who must assess the probabilities of heads or tails
without knowing whether the coin is fair. The coin could be two-
headed, two-tailed, or fair. If the individual assigned equal prob-
abilities to each configuration, he would conclude that the prob-
ability of heads or tails is 0.5, the same probability imputed to a
41. Cf. John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065,
1072 (1968) (demonstrating that a probability of 0.5 is the optimal point for cases in which "the
consequences of an error in one direction are just as serious as the consequences of an error in
the other"). A similar, though different conceptualization of the burden of proof is set forth in
David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statis-
tical Evidence and Multiple Causation, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 487. Like the analysis here,
Kaye conceptualizes the burden of proof as giving equal weight to false positives and false nega-
tives. Unlike the approach here, Kaye relies on a norm of cost minimization. The norm of
equality relied upon here is identical to a norm of cost minimization if the cost of false positives
equals the cost of false negatives, as Kaye assumes. The two norms will not be the same, how-
ever, whenever the costs of the two types of error are not the same, as is frequently the case.
42. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 11, § 150 at 360.
43. See Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion,
and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 387-88 (1986).
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fair coin. The same probability estimate for the two types of coins
does not mean the individual thinks the unknown coin is fair, be-
cause he is much more confident about the probability estimate of a
fair coin than of an unknown coin. The distinction between a prob-
ability estimate and the degree of underlying confidence often oc-
curs when juries evaluate factual allegations. That distinction, in
turn, explains why the evidentiary norm includes the requirement
of reasonableness in the more-likely-than-not standard.
Consider the following case. The plaintiff shows that the de-
fendant was negligent for not providing life-saving equipment on a
boat. To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that, had the
defendant provided life-saving equipment, the decedent would not
have drowned. The causal inquiry is counterfactual, and the jury
will often not know the exact factual context in which the life-
saving equipment would have been used. 44 Suppose a reasonable
juror could consider three contexts without having any basis for
concluding that one is more likely than any other: (1) the life-saving
equipment would have made a difference in most cases; (2) the
equipment would have made a difference in many cases; or (3) the
equipment would have made no difference. Without any informa-
tion concerning the relative likelihood of the three scenarios, the
jury could decide that each scenario is equally likely, implying that
the life-saving equipment had less than a 50% chance of preventing
the drowning. The jury, in other words, would find that the plaintiff
did not satisfy the burden of proof on causation. The ordinary evi-
dentiary standard, however, does not obviously compel the jury to
reach that conclusion. If the evidence is viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable juror could adopt context (1),
in which there is a greater than 50% chance that the equipment
would have prevented the drowning. The ordinary evidentiary
standard appears to sanction such a finding, particularly since the
finding supports the rationale for a duty to provide life-saving
equipment.45 Hence, the plaintiff would not necessarily lose such a
case.4 6
44. See, e.g., Reyes v. Vantage S.S. Co., 609 F.2d 140, 144 (Sth Cir. 1980) (holding that the
factfinder "must be prepared to determine whether there was time for a crew member to go to
the hypothetical storage location, obtain the hypothetical line-throing appliance, move it to the
appropriate firing location, and fire the appliance-all before [the decedent] went limp in the
water").
45. See Vex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause.in.Fact, 9 STAN. L REV. 60, 61-88 (1956)
(arguing that courts will let juries determine cause-in.fact for cases of substantial factual uncer-
tainty over causation if dismissal of the case would undermine the reason for the tort duty). A
more refined version of Malone's thesis is that the nature of the tort duty can create certain
factual presumptions applicable to a causation inquiry involving inherent factual uncertainty.
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On this view, the ordinary evidentiary standard addresses
two aspects of factual uncertainty: the uncertainty associated with
known probabilities (will a fair coin come up heads or tails?); and
the deeper uncertainty or degree of confidence associated with any
given probability estimate (is the coin fair or not?). 47 Cases involv-
ing known probabilities can be readily evaluated in terms of the
more-likely-than-not standard. Cases in which probability esti-
mates are not confidently held, by contrast, are much more difficult
to evaluate in terms of the more-likely-than-not standard. For such
cases, the evidentiary rule can require that any given probability
Predicting how individuals might behave in a counterfactual world, for example, is particularly
fraught with uncertainty. Adopting presumptions of behavior derived from the duty of care
eliminates the uncertainty in a defensible manner, as illustrated by the heeding presumption in
products liability. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also Mark Geistfold, Tort Law
and Criminal Behavior (Guns), 43 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing for a behavioral
presumption in the causal inquiry consistent with the behavioral presumption adopted by the
tort duty). All of the cases discussed by Malone can be rationalized on this ground, as the cases
involve contexts in which the factual uncertainty consists of the lack of knowledge regarding how
the accident victim or someone else would have acted if the defendant had exercised reasonable
care. Whether one adopts Malone's conceptualization of the cause-in-fact inquiry, or an inquiry
based on factual presumptions derived from the duty of care, each conceptualization yields the
type of evidentiary norm discussed in the text.
46. See Reyes, 609 F.2d at 144 (finding for the plaintiff on remand, even though the deco-
dent was drunk while in the water and struggling against a strong current); Kirincich v. Stan-
dard Dredging Co., 112 F.2d 163, 164 (3d Cir. 1940) (remanding case in which the deceased, who
may have been unable to swim, was carried away by the falling tide while "shipmates tried to
save him with inadequate equipment"); Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet
Corp., 10 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1925) ("Nobody could, in the nature of things, be sure that the
intestate would have seized the rope, or, if he had not, that it would have stopped his body ....
[We think it a question about which reasonable men might at least differ .... "). But see Skin-
ner v. Square D Co., 516 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Mich. 1994) ("Nor is it sufficient to submit a causation
theory that, while factually supported, is, at best, just as possible as another theory.").
47. These aspects of the causal inquiry are identified in Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Prob.
ability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 404-05
(1985); Gold, supra note 43. In statistical terminology, the probability estimate is a "point esti.
mate," and the decision-maker's confidence in that estimate is represented by the "confidence
interval." According to Cohen, all point estimates within the confidence interval must exceed
50% to satisfy the plaintiffs burden of proof. See Cohen, supra, at 398-404. This interpretation
of the burden of proof is more demanding than my interpretation, and is inconsistent with the
cases. See supra note 26 (heeding presumption); note 46 (rescue cases). Gold, by contrast, as-
sumes the confidence dimension significantly reduces the plaintiffs burden of proof so that opi-
demiological proof is not required, but he never adequately explains the relationship between the
confidence interval and the plaintiffs burden of proof. See generally Gold, supra note 43. Like
Gold, I assume that not all point estimates in the confidence interval must exceed 50%. Unlike
Gold (and Cohen), I claim that a point estimate within the confidence interval only satisfies the
plaintiffs burden of proof if that estimate satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the eviden-
tiary standard. Reasonableness can be determined by reference to the rationale for the relevant
tort duty, see supra note 45, and presumably can depend on other factors. Cf. Malone, supra
note 45, at 85 (observing that the jury "could fairly be permitted a wide range of speculation at
[defendant's] expense" when "the defendant's conduct was so obviously open to condemnation").
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estimate be based on a reasonable degree of confidence-that is, the
estimate must be based on something more than mere speculation
or conjecture, while accounting for all undisputed facts. Beyond the
minimal requirement of reasonableness, it often will be difficult to
regulate the appropriate relationship between probabilities and the
underlying confidence. Thus the ordinary evidentiary rule: the jury
can conclude that a fact has been established if the evidence, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, would enable a
reasonable juror to conclude that the fact more likely than not ex-
ists.
For these reasons, an evidentiary norm based on the equal
treatment of deserving plaintiffs and non-culpable defendants can
allow for a greater range of evidence than might be suggested by a
narrow interpretation of the more-likely-than-not evidentiary stan-
dard. Nevertheless, the norm supports the epidemiological eviden-
tiary requirement.
In the paradigmatic case of scientific uncertainty, we do not
adequately understand the etiology of the disease or injury, like
cancer. Due to the lack of such knowledge, we infer causal relation-
ships entirely on the basis of associational relationships, such as
those identified by valid epidemiological study. If individuals ex-
posed to the substance have a higher incidence of cancer, we as-
sume this association means there is a causal relation, even though
we do not fully understand the causal mechanism. The causal rela-
tionship is expressed probabilistically: exposure to the substance
increases the risk of cancer by x%. This probability is an estimate,
so there is a degree of confidence associated with the estimate.
However, the degree of confidence is a statistical property that can
be quantified in a non-controversial manner.48
So too, because we do not fully understand the etiology of
cancer, we rely on the results of animal studies or chemical analy-
ses to provide some guidance as to carcinogenicity. Like epidemiol-
ogical studies, the guidance depends entirely on associational rela-
tionships. The nature of the associational relationship is different,
however. The fact that the substance increases the risk of cancer for
mice does not mean it poses the same risk, or any risk, for humans.
To be relevant, the associational relationship identified by nonepi-
demiological proof, like animal studies, must be of the following
type: after adjusting for differences in dose levels, a substance that
is an animal carcinogen will cause the same type of cancer in hu-
48. The appropriate degree of confidence is related to the amount of increased risk that
must be identified by epidemiological study, an issue discussed in Part IV below.
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mans y% of the time, or a different type of cancer in humans z% of
the time.
Now consider the requirement of epidemiological proof in
light of the previously identified evidentiary norm. We have been
assuming the plaintiff has various types of non-epidemiological evi-
dence tending to show that her cancer was caused by exposure to
the defendant's substance. Suppose such evidence correctly identi-
fies a human carcinogen 30% of the time. This evidence does not
show that the substance more likely than not caused the plaintiffs
cancer. Moreover, the jury does not have much latitude in choosing
another number. Unlike other types of cases in which the jury may
have discretion in choosing the context and the associated prob-
ability estimate, it typically will not have such discretion in cases of
scientific uncertainty. Absent an understanding of the cause of can-
cer, probabilities derived from associational relationships are the
only available evidence of carcinogenicity. To reject such a prob-
ability estimate in favor of some other number requires the jury to
make implicit assumptions about the cause of cancer. These as-
sumptions would seem to be nothing other than mere conjecture or
speculation given our lack of knowledge on the matter.
The reasonableness constraint on jury decision-making,
which allows for greater discretion in contexts of factual uncer-
tainty such as the drowning example, therefore limits the jury's
discretion in the paradigmatic case of scientific uncertainty. Unless
the non-epidemiological evidence correctly identifies the substance
as a sufficiently potent human carcinogen at least 50% of the time,
that evidence does not provide a reasonable basis for the jury to
conclude that the substance more likely than not caused the plain-
tiffs cancer.49 Whenever non-epidemiological evidence is unable to
satisfy this condition, the evidentiary rule can require epidemiol-
ogical evidence for satisfying the plaintiffs burden of proof.
But what about the aspirational aspect of the evidentiary
norm that strives to apportion equally the burden of factual uncer-
tainty between plaintiffs and defendants? The epidemiological evi-
dentiary requirement systematically disadvantages plaintiffs, be-
cause no individual plaintiff will find it cost-effective to undertake
such studies in light of the high cost and low probability of identi-
fying the substance as a human carcinogen. This systematic unfair-
49. Merely because a substance is a human carcinogen does not mean that the substance
more likely than not caused the plaintiffs cancer. The potency of the carcinogen-the degree to
which it increases the risk of cancer-is an additional factor that must be identified to make non-
epidemiological proof relevant. SeeinfraPartIV.
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ness suggests that the epidemiological evidentiary standard cannot
be justified if the alternative evidentiary rule would not unfairly
disadvantage non-culpable defendants. In the present state of sci-
ence, this outcome does not seem to be attainable.
Suppose the plaintiff can satisfy the burden of proof by re-
lying solely on non-epidemiological evidence, including animal
studies or laboratory indicators of carcinogenicity.50 The defendant
cannot rebut until the epidemiological studies have been completed,
so the defendant will typically lose. Is this outcome acceptable in
light of the tort norm that strives to apportion equally the burden of
factual uncertainty?
As before, suppose that in 30% of cases involving only animal
studies and other non-epidemiological evidence, the substance
turns out to be a human carcinogen. If the plaintiff can satisfy the
burden of proof with this evidence, then 70% of these cases will re-
sult in the defendant being liable for a non-carcinogen-the chance
of a false positive is 70%.51 This rate of false positives must be com-
pared to the rate of false negatives produced by the alternative rule
that requires epidemiological evidence. This rule means that some
deserving plaintiffs will not recover. In the example, 30% of the
cases based entirely on non-epidemiological evidence will involve
human carcinogens. Hence, the evidentiary rule requiring epidemi-
ological evidence lets culpable defendants escape liability in 30% of
the cases-the rate of false negatives.
Ideally, an evidentiary standard should balance the rates of
false positives (the interests of non-culpable defendants) and false
negatives (the interests of deserving plaintiffs), the type of balanc-
ing reflected in the more-likely-than-not standard. Such a balance
cannot be achieved in this context. The choice in the example is be-
tween a rule not requiring epidemiological proof with a 70% rate of
false positives and an alternative rule requiring epidemiological
proof with a 30% rate of false negatives. The error rates cannot be
balanced, implying that one set of interests will suffer dispropor-
tionately by bearing the entire burden of factual uncertainty. If the
choice is made by reference to a norm that gives equal weight to
each set of interests, then the choice should minimize the burden
that must be imposed on one set of interests. As between a 70% rate
of false positives and a 30% rate of false negatives, a rule creating
the latter burden is fairer. The burden the rule places on deserving
50. This sort of burden is proposed in many of the sources cited at supra note 8.
51. This number conservatively favors the plaintiff because it omits consideration of po-
tency. Cf. supra note 49.
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plaintiffs is less than the burden that would be placed on non-
culpable defendants by the alternative rule. The equal weight given
to each set of interests therefore justifies the requirement of epide-
miological proof, despite the disproportionate burden placed on
plaintiffs.
IV. LIMITS OF THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EVIDENTIARY
REQUIREMENT
Although the epidemiological evidentiary requirement is
consistent with tort norms, we must still consider whether courts
have properly formulated the requirement. According to some
courts, epidemiological proof is required in all cases and is relevant
only if it shows that the substance at least doubles the risk of in-
jury.52 This strong form of the evidentiary requirement is inconsis-
tent with tort law. The most defensible form of the requirement is
limited to contexts in which non-epidemiological proof is not suffi-
ciently reliable, and even in those contexts the epidemiological
proof need not show a doubling of risk to establish causation.
The epidemiological evidentiary requirement is necessarily
dependent on the current state of science and the types of non-
epidemiological proof proffered by the plaintiff. The prior analysis
shows that the epidemiological evidentiary requirement is justified
whenever the causal evidence consists solely of non-epidemiological
proof that would yield incorrect liability findings (false positives)
more than one-half of the time. Non-epidemiological proof, such as
animal studies, will become more reliable with advances in scien-
tific knowledge. Animal studies are likely to become better predic-
tors of human risk as scientists determine the mechanisms by
which families of chemicals act on the environment and human
health.53 Similarly, advances in genetic knowledge and the ma-
nipulation of genes have the potential to greatly increase the reli-
ability of animal studies. 54 Because animal studies and other forms
52. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
53. The chemical industry is funding such a study. '"Many scientists think [the study] will
provide the means to determine when it does or does not make sense to extrapolate from epide.
miological studies and animal tests to assessments of a chemicars human health risks." Claudia
H. Deutsch, Chemical Industry to Spend $1 Billion to Assess Product Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
1999, at A14.
54. For example, the new field of toxicogenomics involves the laboratory testing of animals
or cells to determine the pattern of gene activity involved upon exposure to a potentially hazard-
ous substance. "This pattern of gene activity, at least in theory, should indicate whether the
chemical is toxic, much as DNA fingerprints are used to judge the guilt or innocence of criminal
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of non-epidemiological proof may become sufficiently reliable to
satisfy the plaintiffs burden of proof for cases in which epidemiol-
ogical proof is unavailable, the epidemiological evidentiary re-
quirement must acknowledge this possibility and be limited ac-
cordingly.
Another important limitation of the evidentiary requirement
involves the degree of risk that must be identified by epidemiologi-
cal study. Epidemiological proof showing a doubling in risk is a su-
perficially appealing requirement. Given the extreme uncertainty
and the associated limitation on the jury's discretion, epidemiologi-
cal proof showing a doubling of risk would seem to be the only non-
speculative evidence showing that the substance more likely than
not caused the plaintiffs injury. A requirement that epidemiological
proof must always show at least a doubling in risk, however, is in-
consistent with tort norms.
Epidemiological study can determine whether a substance
increases the incidence of a given disease or injury within a popula-
tion of sufficiently homogenous individuals. Epidemiological proof
therefore identifies per capita risk for a population rather than the
risk faced by each individual member. Due to the difference be-
tween per capita population risk and individual risk, the doubling-
in-risk requirement cannot be defended for diseases with unknown
etiology, such as cancer.
Consider a case in which the defendant tortiously exposed
the female plaintiff to radiation, and the plaintiff subsequently de-
velops bone cancer. Suppose valid epidemiological proof shows the
baseline or background risk of bone cancer in the population of non-
exposed women is two in one thousand by age forty-five, whereas
the risk of bone cancer in the population of exposed women is three
in one thousand by age forty-five. Suppose the plaintiff has all the
relevant characteristics of other members of the studied population,
so the per capita population risk is relevant for determining the
risk faced by the plaintiff. According to the doubling-in-risk re-
quirement, this epidemiological evidence is not admissible and the
suspects." Andrew Pollack, DNA Chip May Help Usher In a New Era of Product Testing, N.Y.
TIZES, Nov. 28, 2000, at F2. Another significant development, based on recombinant DNA tech-
niques, involves "transgenic mice" whose genes have been manipulated to greatly increase our
"understanding how interactions between individual genes and the environment affect human
health." Mitch Eddy, The Use of Transgenic Mice for Environmental Health Research, in
INNOVATIONS, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVES, VoL 101, No. 4 (Sept. 1993), available at
http:llehpneti.niehs.nih.gov/docsl1993lO1-4/innovations.html. For a description of various
transgenic models, and their relation to human risk assessment, see Taconic Aninzal Aodels,
Taconic Transgenic Models, available at http/Avww%.taconic.com/anmadelitrans-
genic%20model%201ist,6202001.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
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plaintiff must lose the case because the evidence shows that her
bone cancer more likely than not was caused by the background
risk and not the radiation exposure. The conclusion is unsound,
however, because it inappropriately assumes that the cases of bone
cancer caused by the background risk (two in one thousand) are in-
dependent of the cases of bone cancer caused by the radiation expo-
sure. As two epidemiologists explain:
[I]t is possible that exposure interacts with background factors to advance the in.
cidence time of all bone cancer cases. This would happen if the cancer is the end-
point of a pathologic process whose rate is accelerated by radiation exposure. Thus,
it could be that the two background cases (the two women who would have gotten
bone cancer at age 45 even without exposure) instead got their cancer years earlier
because of exposure; while the three cases that occurred at age 45 would not have
occurred until years later absent the exposure. In fact, it could be that exposure
causally contributed to all cancers at all ages by accelerating all the incidence
times.-
Because we do not fully understand the etiology of cancer,
we cannot determine the etiology of any individual case of cancer.
Of the various plausible models of cancer or other important
chronic diseases, none rule out the type of scenario in which expo-
sure facilitates the onset of injury in all exposed individuals rather
than merely creating injuries additional to those caused by the
background risk.56 As a result, the per capita population risk identi-
fied by epidemiological study is likely to underestimate the degree
of risk faced by any individual.57
Whereas our limited understanding of the etiology of cancer
justifies the epidemiological evidentiary requirement, that same
lack of knowledge undermines the doubling-in-risk requirement.
Suppose the epidemiological proof identifies an increase in per cap-
ita population risk of 1.9. Because the per capita population risk is
likely to underestimate the degree of individual risk, a jury (if given
the appropriate biological evidence on how exposure might facilitate
the disease) could reasonably conclude that the exposure increased
individual risk by at least a factor of two, enabling it to find that
55. Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of
Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 321, 327 (2000). For other criticisms of the assumption that the
per capita risk equals the individual risk, see Mark Parascandola, What Is Wrong with the Prob-
ability of Causation?, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 29, 35-41 (1998).
56. See Greenland & Robins, supra note 55, at 325.
57. See generally id.; see also Louis A. Cox, Jr., Statistical Issues in the Estimation of As.
signed Shares for Carcinogenesis Liability, 7 RIsK ANALYSIS 71, 72-73 (1987); Sander Greenland
& James M. Robins, Conceptual Problems in the Definition and Interpretation of Attributable
Fractions, 128 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1185, 1192-93 (1988); James M. Robins & Sander Green.
land, Estimability and Estimation of Excess and Etiologic Fractions, 8 STAT. MED. 845, 850-51
(1989).
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the exposure more likely than not injured the plaintiff. This conclu-
sion is most compelling for risk increases slightly less than two, but
the logic applies more generally to any risk increase sufficient to
establish tortious conduct by the defendant.
Reconsider the case in which the defendant exposed the fe-
male plaintiff to radiation, thereby increasing the per capita popu-
lation risk from two in one thousand to three in one thousand. Sup-
pose this epidemiological proof, in conjunction with the other rele-
vant evidence, shows an increase in risk sufficient to establish that
the defendant acted tortiously. If the plaintiff could introduce ex-
pert testimony showing that the exposure facilitated her injury ac-
cording to a plausible biological model, she would not conclusively
prove that her cancer was facilitated by the radiation. The defen-
dant cannot conclusively disprove the point. Importantly, though,
the causal question facing the jury is essentially similar to the
causal question courts frequently submit to juries in the rescue
cases discussed earlier.58 The defendant has breached a duty of care
to the plaintiff. Whether the breach caused harm (failure to rescue)
is very plausible but impossible to determine. Nevertheless, as long
as the facts permit a reasonable juror to find causation, courts
submit the causal question to the jury. By contrast, courts that
adopt the doubling-in-risk evidentiary requirement would not sub-
mit the cancer case to the jury, even though the defendant's breach
quite plausibly harmed the plaintiff. The causal inquiry is not fun-
damentally different than the rescue cases.
To be sure, the cancer case involves tortious conduct that fa-
cilitated the injury, whereas the rescue cases do not necessarily in-
volve injuries of that type (either the decedent would have drowned
or not). Such distinction is irrelevant, however. The facilitation of
injury is compensable in tort (wrongful death, for example, is
merely facilitation of the inevitable).59 As long as the jury can rea-
sonably conclude that the defendant's tortious conduct more likely
than not facilitated the injury, the question of how much harm the
defendant caused-how greatly was the cancer facilitated?-is one
of damages, and it is therefore governed by an evidentiary standard
that does not require epidemiological proof.6 0
58. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
59. For a discussion of these issues, and the supporting citations, see David A. Fischer, Suc-
cessive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L REV. 1127, 1134-60 (1999).
60. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. As this statement suggests, the facilita-
tion theory may require a damages claim based on the assumption that the plaintiff .,ould have
gotten cancer at a later date.
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Courts often let juries decide highly uncertain causal ques-
tions in contexts that are indistinguishable from the cancer case
under discussion.61 Hence, tort law does not support the require-
ment that epidemiological proof is admissible only if it identifies at
least a doubling in risk. The only requirement is that epidemiologi-
cal proof must identify an increase in risk sufficient to establish
that the defendant acted tortiously. Any other limitations on the
proof must be context dependent, involving the nature of the injury,
the type of epidemiological study, and so on.
CONCLUSION
Cases involving scientific uncertainty should be resolved on
the basis of the appropriate tort norm for allocating the burden of
factual uncertainty. This norm does not require epidemiological
proof in the products liability context, because such proof is pri-
marily relevant for damages rather than causation. For damage
issues, the tort norm allocates the burden of factual uncertainty to
the defendant. In other contexts, epidemiological evidence is pri-
marily relevant for causation, and the requirement of epidemiologi-
cal proof is consistent with a tort norm of equality. The require-
ment, however, is limited by various contextual considerations, in-
cluding the current state of science, and the epidemiological proof
need not always show at least a doubling in risk.
The epidemiological evidentiary requirement illustrates the
importance of causation in a system of corrective justice, although
it can also be justified in terms of allocative efficiency. The primary
economic problem posed by cases of scientific uncertainty is to iden-
tify the most cost-effective means of attaining the optimal level of
research. Unlike most tort issues, the problem is particularly suit-
able for the centralized solutions offered by administrative regula-
tion.62 Research on chemicals and other substances yields informa-
tion that is a public good, so the amount of research will probably
be sub-optimally under-supplied by individual actors responding to
61. See DOBBS, supra note 11, § 173 at 420-22 (collecting cases supporting the conclusion
that courts are "avowedly liberal with causation issues" whenever "the defendant's conduct is
deemed negligent for the very reason that it creates a core risk of the kind of harm suffered by
the plaintiff'); see also supra notes 45-47 (providing rationales for this approach to the cause-in-
fact inquiry).
62. See generally Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safely, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984) (providing a general discussion of the economic factors relevant to the
choice between adminstrative and tort regulation).
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the incentives of tort liability. 63 More research will also improve the
scientific procedures of risk identification, but individual actors re-
sponding to the incentives of tort liability would not account for
these social benefits, again leading to a problem of under-supply.
Inadequate research is the most troubling problem posed by cases
of scientific uncertainty, but the appropriate solution is more ag-
gressive administrative regulation rather than relaxing the causal
requirement in tort law.64
63. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market-Share Allocations in Tort Law: Strengths and Weak-
nesses, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 739, 745-46 (1990).
64. Compare Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that
Safety Matters More Than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (shoing how cost-
benefit methodology supports the aggressive administrative regulation of potentially hazardous
substances in non-contractual settings pursuant to the precautionary principle).
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